This paper studies the resilient distributed recovery of large fields under measurement attacks, by a team of agents, where each measures a small subset of the components of a large spatially distributed field. An adversary corrupts some of the measurements. The agents collaborate to process their measurements, and each is interested in recovering only a fraction of the field. We present a field recovery consensus+innovations type distributed algorithm that is resilient to measurement attacks, where an agent maintains and updates a local state based on its neighbors states and its own measurement. Under sufficient conditions on the attacker and the connectivity of the communication network, each agent's state, even those with compromised measurements, converges to the true value of the field components that it is interested in recovering. Finally, we illustrate the performance of our algorithm through numerical examples.
INTRODUCTION
In many applications in the Internet of Things (IoT), device instrument a large environment and measure a spatially distributed field. For example, a network of roadside units measures traffic patterns throughout a city [1] , and teams of mobile robots collaborate to map and navigate unknown environments [2] . The devices need to process their measurements to extract useful information about the physical field. IoT devices, however, are vulnerable to cyber attack [3, 4] . Without proper security countermeasures, adversaries may hijack individual devices, manipulate their measurements, and prevent them from achieving their computation objectives.
This paper studies the distributed recovery of large physical fields under measurement attacks. The agents or devices make measurements of the unknown field in their proxomity, and process their measurements to recover the value of the field. Due to the field's large size, no individual agent seeks to recover the entire field. Instead, each agent seeks to recover a subset of the field components. For example, in multi-robot navigation, an individual robot attempts to recover just its local surroundings instead of mapping the entire environment. The devices are unable to recover their desired components of the field using just their local measurements; they share information over a communication network to accomplish their processing objectives, but an adversary may attempt to thwart this goal by arbitrarily manipulating a subset of the measurements. Each agent's goal is to process its measurement and information from its network neighbors to recover specific components of the field without being misled by the adversary. This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy under award number de-oe0000779, by DARPA under agreement numbers FA8750-12-2-0291 and HR00111320007, and by the National Science Foundation under award numbers CCF1513936 and CNS1837607.
We present a consensus+innovations type algorithm [5, 6] for resilient field recovery. Device maintain and update a local state (an estimate of the field components of interest) based on the state of its neighbors in the network and its own measurements. When updating its state, each device applies an adaptive state dependent gain to its own measurements to mitigate the effects of potential measurement attacks. We show that, under sufficient conditions on the compromised measurements and on the connectivity of the communication network, our algorithm ensures that all of the agents' local states converge to the true values of their desired field components.
Prior work in resilient computation has focused on settings where all devices or agents share a common processing objective. For example, in resilient consensus, agents attempt to reach agreement on a decision or value in the presence of adversaries [7] [8] [9] and in resilient parameter estimation, agents attempt to recover a common unknown parameter from local measurements while coping with malicious data [10] [11] [12] . In contrast, in resilient field recovery, agents have different, heterogeneous processing objectives. This makes the problem more challenging: when communicating with neighbors, agents must further process their neighbors' messages to extract information relevant to its own objectives.
Existing work has studied field recovery in nonadversarial environments. In [13] , the authors design a procedure to optimally place sensors in a spatially correlated field. Reference [14] studies distributed recovery of static fields, and reference [15] designs distributed Kalman Filters for estimating very large time-varying random fields. None of these references, however, address field recovery in adversarial scenarios. In contrast, this paper presents an algorithm for resilient field recovery under measurement attacks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the measurement and attack models and formalizes the field recovery problem. We present our resilient distributed field recovery algorithm in Section 3 and analyze its performance in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the performance of our algorithm through numerical examples, and we conclude in Section 6.
Notation: Let R k be the Euclidean space of dimension k, I k the k by k identity matrix, and 1 k the column vector of k ones. The j th canonical basis vector of R k (j = 1, . . . , k) is ej, a column vector with 1 in the j th element and 0 elsewhere. For symmetric matrices A = A , A 0 (A 0) means that A is positive definite (semidefinite). For a matrix A, [A]i,j is the element in the i th row and j th colunm. For a vector v, [v]i is the i th element. A simple undirected graph G = (V, E) has vertex set V = {1, . . . , N } and edge set E. Each vertex n has neighborhood Ωn (the set of vertices that share an edge with vertex n) and degree dn = |Ωn|. The degree matrix of G is D = diag (d1, . . . , dN ), the adjacency matrix is A, where [A] n,l = 1 if there is an edge between vertex n and vertex l and [A] n,l = 0 otherwise, and the Laplacian matrix is L = D − A. The Laplacian matrix has ordered eigenvalues λ1(L) ≤ λ2(L) ≤ · · · ≤ λN (L), where λ1(L) = 0. For connected graphs λ2(L) > 0. References [16, 17] review spectral graph theory.
BACKGROUND
Consider N agents or devices measuring an unknown field collected in the parameter θ * ∈ R M . The field parameter θ * is high dimensional and spatially distributed over a large physical area; for example, in the context of multi-robot navigation, it may represent the location of obstacles in a large unknown environment. In normal operation conditions (i.e., in the absence of measurement attacks), each agent's measurement is yn = Hnθ * .
(1)
The measurements may have different dimensions across agents: we let Pn M be the dimension of agent n's measurement (i.e., yn(t) ∈ R Pn and Hn ∈ R Pn×M ). An adversary changes arbitrarily manipulates a subset of the measurement values. We model the effect of the attack with the additive disturbance an: yn = Hnθ * + an.
(2)
In this paper, we focus on distributed field recovery from a single snapshot of (noiseless) measurements at each agent. The case of noisy measurement streams (i.e., sequences of measurements over time yn(0), yn(1), . . . ) is the subject of our ongoing work [18] . We use the convention from [12] for indexing scalar measurement globally across all agents. Let
be the vector of all (scalar) measurements at time t, where H = H 1 · · · H N stacks the measurement matrices H1, . . . , HN , and, similarly, a stacks the measurement attacks. The stacked measurement y has dimension P = N i=1 Pn. We label the individual components of y and the rows of H from 1 to P : y = y (1) · · · y (P ) , H = h1 · · · hp . From the above indexing convention, we assign the indices P n + 1, . . . , P n + Pn, where P n = n−1 j=0 Pj, to the individual components of yn, the individual components of an and rows of Hn (of agent n). We assume that every row of H is nonzero and has unit 2-norm, i.e., hp 2 = 1 for all p = 1. . . . , P . The set A = p ∈ {1, . . . , P } |a (p) = 0 is the set of compromised measurements, and N = {1, . . . , P } \ A is the set of uncompromised measurements. The agents do not know which measurements are compromised.
The field parameter θ * is high dimensional and spatially distributed over a large physical area, so, each agent's measurement is only physically coupled to a few components of θ * . The measurement matrices Hn capture the physical coupling between the field θ * and the measurements yn(t). We define the physical coupling set
where em is the m th canonical basis vector of R M , as the indices of the nonzero columns of the matrix Hn. The set In describes all components of θ * that are physically coupled to the measurement at agent n.
In distributed field recovery, each agent is interested in recovering a subset of components of θ * . This contrasts with the setup of distributed parameter estimation [11, 12] , where each agent is interested in estimating all components of θ * . In the context of robotic navigation, for example, each robot may only be interested in estimating its local surroundings instead of the entirety of the (large) unknown environment. For agent n, its interest set In is the set of components of θ * that it wishes to recover, sorted in ascending order. Following the convention from [14] , the expression In (r) = m means that the r th element of the In (for r = 1, . . . , |In|) is the component m (i.e., the m th component of θ * ). Conversely, I −1 n (m) = r means that component m is the r th element in In.
We require each agent's physical coupling set to be a subset of its interest set, i.e., In ⊆ In, for all n = 1, . . . , N . In addition to each agent's interest set, we also define, for each component of θ * m = 1, . . . , M , Jm = {n ∈ {1, . . . , N } |m ∈ In} , the set of all agents interested in recovering component m. We assume that, for all m = 1, . . . , M , the set Jm is nonempty.
Each individual agent may not have enough information from its local measurements alone to recover all components in its interest set. The agents exchange information over a communication network, modeled as an undirected graph G = (V, E), where the vertex set V is the set of agents and the edge set E represents communication links between agents. For each component m = 1, . . . , M of the field θ * , let Gm be the graph induced by all agents interested in recovering m, i.e., all agents in Jm. We assume that each subnetwork Gm is connected for all m.
An important concept in field and parameter recovery is global observability. We assume that the set of all measurements is globally observable for θ * : the observability Grammian matrix G = H H = P p=1 hph p is invertible. Global observability means that, using the stacked measurement vector yt, it is possible to exactly determine the value of θ * . Global observability is required for a fusion center, which collects and simultaneously processes the measurements of all of the agents, to recover θ * , so we assume it here for a fully distributed setting.
RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED FIELD RECOVERY
In this section, we present a distributed field recovery algorithm that is resilient to measurement attacks.
Algorithm Description
Each agent n maintains a |In|-dimensional state xn(t), where the i th component [xn(t)] i is an estimate of [θ * ] In(i) . Initially, each agent sets its state as xn(t) = 0 and iteratively updates its state according to the following procedure.
Step 1 -Communication: Each agent n sends its current state xn(t) to each of its neighors l ∈ Ωn.
Step 2 -Message Censorship: To account for different interest sets, each agent processes the states received from it neighbors. First, each agent n, for each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn, constructs a censored state x c l,n (t) component-wise as follows:
for i = 1, . . . , |In|. Second, for each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn, agent n also constructs a processed version of its own state, x p l,n (t), component-wise as follows:
Step 3 -State Update: Each agent n updates its state following
where the matrix H c n ∈ R Pn×|In| is the matrix Hn after removing all columns whose indices are not in In, Kn(t) is a diagonal gain matrix to be defined shortly, and αt and βt are decaying weight sequences of the form αt = a (t+1) τ 1 , βt = b (t+1) τ 2 . We select the scalar hyperparmeters a, b, τ1, τ2 to satisfy a, b > 0 and 0 < τ2 < τ1 < 1. The gain matrix Kn(t) is defined as
where, for p = P n + 1, . . . , P n + Pn,
h c p is the row vector h p after removing all components not in In, and γt is a decaying threshold sequence of the form γt = Γ (t+1) τγ . We select the scalar hyperparameters Γ and τγ to satisfy Γ > 0 and 0 < τγ < τ1 − τ2.
The gain matrix Kn(t) saturates the magnitude of each component of its innovation, yn − H c n xn(t), at the threshold level, γt. The threshold γt decays over time, which decreases the amount by which the innovation is able to influence the state update. Intuitively, this means that, initially, the agents are more willing to trust measurements that differ greatly from their current estimates of the field. As the agents update their states, they expect their estimates to move closer to the true values of the field, and they become less willing to trust measurements that differ greatly from their current estimates. By decaying the threshold over time, the agents prevent their states from being led astray by compromised measurements while still incorporating enough information from the uncompromised measurements to recover their desired field components.
Compared with algorithms for resilient distributed parameter recovery or estimation from [11, 12] , the algorithm in this paper introduces the additional message censorship step. This additional step is required because, unlike parameter recovery or estimation, where all of the agents are interested in recovering all components of θ * , in distributed field recovery, each agent is only interested in recovering a subset of the components of θ * . Through message censorship, each agent n extracts information from their neighbors' states about only the components of θ * it is interested in recovering.
Main Result: Algorithm Performance
For each agent n, let θ * In be the |In|-dimensional vector that collects all components of θ * in which it is interested in recovering. We express θ * In component-wise as θ * In i = [θ * ] In(i) for all i = 1, . . . , |In|. The following theorem characterizes the behavior of the agents' local states under our resilient distributed field recovery algorithm.
Theorem 1. Let A = p1, . . . , p |A| be the set of compromised measurements, and let HA = hp 1 · · · hp |A| be the matrix that collects all rows of H indexed by elements in A. If the matrix GN = p∈N hph p satisfies λmin (GN ) > ∆A, (10) where N = P \ A and
then, under the algorithm described in Section 3.1, we have
for all agents n and every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ.
Theorem 1 states that, as long as the resilience condition in (10) is satisfied, the agents' local states converge to the true values of the field components they are interested in recovering. The sufficient resilience condition (10) is a condition on the redundancy of uncompromised measurements and intuitively means that the uncompromised measurements (across all agents) should collectively measure θ * redundantly enough to overcome the influence of the compromised measurements. The resilience of our field recovery algorithm depends on the redundancy of the measurements and not on the agents' interest sets. In addition to the resilience condition (10), we also have requirements on the topology of the communication network G. Recall, from Section 2, that, for each component m = 1, . . . , M , we require Gm, the subgraph of the communication network G induced by the agents interested in recovering component m, to be connected.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of our resilient distributed field recovery algorithm. Due to space limitations, we outline the main steps, presented as intermediate results, to prove Theorem 1, and we provide a detailed analysis in the appendix. The performance anlaysis follows three main steps. First, we transform each agent's state into an auxiliary state. Second, we show that all of the agents' auxiliary states converges to a generalized network average state. Finally, we show that the generalized network average state converges to the true value of the field.
For each agent n, we define the auxiliary state xn(t) ∈ R M (recall that M is the dimension of the field θ * ) component-wise as
for each i = 1, . . . , M . Let xt = x1(t) · · · xN (t) stack the auxiliary states of all the agents. We may show that xt evolves according to
where Kt = blkdiag (K1(t), . . . , KN (t)) , DH = blkdiag(H1, . . . , HN ), and the N M × N M matrix L is defined blockwise as follows. Let [L] n,l ∈ R M ×M be the (n, l)-th sub-block of L, for n, l = 1, . . . , N , which is defined as
where, for each agent n, the matrix Qn is an M ×M diagonal matrix where the m th diagonal element (for m = 1, . . . M ) is 1 if agent n is interested in recovering [θ * ] m (i.e., m ∈ In) and 0 otherwise. In (15) , the term [L] n,l refers to the (n, l)-th (scalar) element of the Laplacian L. We now use the auxiliary state update (14) to analyze the performance of the distribute field recovery algorithm.
Let xt = D (1 N ⊗ IM ) xt, where D = diag(|J1| −1 , . . . , |JM | −1 ), be the generalized network average state. Each component m = 1, . . . , M of xt is the average estimate of [θ * ] m taken over all agents interested in recovering that specific component (i.e., all agents n ∈ Jm). Define the matrix Q = blkdiag (Q1, . . . , QN ). Then, we may show the following result: Lemma 1. Under the algorithm from section 3.1,
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
Lemma 1 states that, under the our algorithm, the auxiliary state of each agent n = 1, . . . , N , xn(t) converges to the generalized network average state xt on all components the interest set In.
We now study the behavior of the generalized network average state xt. We are interested in et = xt − θ * , the generalized network average state error. We may show the following result:
Under the algorithm from section 3.1, as long as λmin (GN ) > ∆A, then
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ.
Lemma 2 states that, under the resilience condition λmin (GN ) > ∆A (10), the generalized network average state converges to the true value of the field θ * . Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we provide a proof sketch of Theorem 1. From the triangle inequality, we have
Then, from Lemmas 1 and 2, under the resilience condition (10), we have limt→∞ (t + 1) τ 3 Q xt 2 = 0, and limt→∞(t+1) τ 0 et 2 = 0 for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2 and every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ. Substituting the above relationships into (18) yields the desired result (12).
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We consider a mesh network of N = 400 robots agents sensing an unknown environment, modeled by a two dimensional 230 unit by 230 unit grid. We assign each grid square a [0, 255]-valued state variable that represents the safety or occupancy of that particular location. For example, a state value of 0 may represent a location that is completely free of obstacles, and a state value of 255 may represent an impassable obstacle. The field parameter θ * is the collection of the 52, 900 state values from each location. Figure 1 visualizes the true field: the x and y axis represent location coordinates and the z axis (θ * axis) gives the state value of each (x, y) coordinate location. Each agent measures the state values of all locations in a 37×37 unit square subgrid centered at its location and is interested in recovering the state values of all locations in a 73 × 73 unit subgrid centered at its location. An adversary attacks 45 of the agents and changes all (scalar) measurements of each agent under attack to y (p) = 255. We compare the performance of our field recovery algorithm against the algorithm from [14] , CIRFE, which does not account for measurement attacks, using the following hyperparameters: a = 1, b = 0.084, τ1 = 0.26, τ2 = 0.001, Γ = 40, τγ = 0.25. Figure 2 shows that the measurement attack induces a persistent local recovery error under CIRFE, while, under our resilient algorithm, each agent's recovery error converges to 0 despite the attack. Figure 3 shows the recovery results of our resilient algorithm and CIRFE after 200 iterations, where, at each location, we report the worst recovery result (highest RMSE) over all interested agents. Under our algorithm, all agents resiliently recover the components of the field in which they are interested, while under CIRFE, the same measurement attack prevents the agents from accurately recovering the field.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an algorithm for resilient distributed field recovery. A network of devices or agents measures a large, spatially distributed field. An adversary compromises a subset of the measurements, arbitrarily changing their values. Each agent processes its (possibly altered) measurements and information from its neighbors to recover certain components of the field. We presented a distributed, consensus+innovations type algorithm for resilient field recovery. As long as there is enough redundancy among the uncompromised measurements in measuring the field, then, our algorithm guarantees that all of the agents' local states converge to the true values of the field components that they are interested in recovering. Finally, we illustrated the performance of our algorithm through numerical examples.
A. PROOF OF LEMMAS 1 AND 2
We now provide the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2.
A.1. Intermediate Results
We first present intermediate results from [?, 6, 18] . First, the following Lemma from [5] characterizes the behavior of scalar timevarying systems of the form wt+1 = (1 − r1(t)) wt + r2(t),
where r1(t) = c 1 (t+1) δ 1 , r2(t) = c 2 (t+1) δ 2 , c1, c2 > 0, and 0 < δ1 < δ2 < 1. 
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ2 − δ1.
Second, the following result comes as a consequence of Lemma 3 in [12] and studies the convergence of scalar time-varying systems of the form wt+1 = 1 − r1(t)c3 (|wt| + c5) (t + 1) δ 3 wt + r1(t)c4 (t + 1) δ 4 ,
where r1(t) = c 1 (t+1) δ 1 , c3, c4, c5 > 0, and 0 < δ3 < δ4 < δ1.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 3 in [12] ). The system in (21) satisfies lim t→∞ (t + 1) δ 0 wt = 0,
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ4 − δ3.
Finally, the following result from Lemma 4.2 in [18] studies perturbations to positive definite matrices: Lemma 5. Let A1 0 (A1 ∈ R k×k ) be a symmetric, positive definite matrix with minimum eigenvalue λmin (A1). Let x = 0, x ∈ R k , and let y ∈ R k satisfy y 2 < λmin (A1) x 2 . Then there exists A2 0 such that
with a minimum eigenvalue that satisfies λmin (A2) ≥ λmin (A1) − y 2 x 2 .
(24)
